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THE SUPREME COURT’S LONG AND PERHAPS
UNNECESSARY STRUGGLE TO FIND A STANDARD
OF CULPABILITY TO REGULATE THE FEDERAL
EXCLUSIONARY REMEDY FOR
FOURTH/FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS
Melvyn Zarr*
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 14, 2009, the United States Supreme Court decided Herring v.
United States.1 In Herring, the defendant moved to suppress evidence that he
alleged was seized as a result of an arrest that violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.2 The Supreme Court approved the decision
below to deny suppression of the evidence.3
The decision set off a flurry of speculation that the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule would not see its 100th birthday in 2014. A headline in the New
York Times of January 31 declared: “Supreme Court Edging Closer to Repeal of
Evidence Ruling.”4 Another headline in the Times, this one on February 16, asked:
“Is the Supreme Court About to Kill off the Exclusionary Rule?”5 A headline in
the April ABA Journal announced that the exclusionary rule was “closer to
repeal.”6
I think that the rumors of the death of the exclusionary rule are exaggerated.
Herring represents another chapter in a long struggle that the Supreme Court has
had with itself to define what sort of fault or culpability on the part of law
enforcement officers should lead to suppression.
One could argue that the officer’s fault or culpability is sufficiently established
if the officer conducts a search or seizure that is unreasonable within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. That is what the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio
seemed to say.7 But that is not how the law has developed; something more than a
constitutional violation is required for a federal exclusionary or damages remedy.
This “something more” originated in actions for damages and then spilled over into
the exclusionary rule. A pivotal moment occurred in 1976 in Stone v. Powell,
when the Court used a cost-benefit balancing approach to limit the applicability of
* Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law, 1973 to present; A.B., Clark University,
1958; LL.B. Harvard Law School, 1963. I want to thank Tina Nadeau, Class of 2010, and her team for
putting this piece into publishable form and making it more readable, and my faculty colleagues,
particularly Professor Jennifer Wriggins, for helpful comments on the draft.
1. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
2. Id. at 699.
3. Id.
4. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Edging Closer to Repeal of Evidence Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
2009, at A1.
5. Adam Cohen, Is the Supreme Court About to Kill Off the Exclusionary Rule?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
16, 2009, at A22.
6. David G. Savage, Who’s Policing the Fourth Amendment?, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2009, at 19.
7. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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the exclusionary rule.8 The costs include the suppression of often reliable evidence
of guilt.9 The benefits are framed in terms of deterrence of police misconduct.10
The idea is to balance the costs and benefits in such a way as to avoid an imbalance
between the magnitude of the police misconduct and the so-called windfall
afforded a criminal defendant.11 Justice White, in his dissenting opinion, accepted
the balancing approach and proposed that if an officer’s conduct was insufficiently
culpable to justify a damages remedy, it should be deemed insufficiently culpable
to justify an exclusionary remedy.12 In succeeding cases, Justice White was able to
garner a majority for his alignment of the standards of culpability for the federal
exclusionary and damages remedies.13
Justice White’s program, to be understood, must be put in historical context.
Mapp v. Ohio involved officer conduct that was not only unconstitutional but truly
culpable by any definition. Yet the exclusionary rule that Mapp produced called
for exclusion of all evidence unconstitutionally obtained, whether the violation was
determined to be “flagrant” or “technical.” Four months before the Court decided
Mapp, it decided Monroe v. Pape, which also involved flagrantly unconstitutional
police misconduct.14 Monroe generated a body of federal law on the culpability
requirement for a damages remedy. It was this culpability requirement that Justice
White was able to import into federal law governing the exclusionary remedy in
United States v. Leon15 and Malley v. Briggs.16
The relationship between officer culpability and deterrence is subject to
considerable uncertainty. I will not dwell on this now, but it will be a recurring
theme. The general idea is that the officer’s conduct must be sufficiently culpable
to be optimally deterrable. Herring emphasizes that deterrence “varies with the
culpability of the law enforcement conduct.”17 But if the officer’s conduct is only
marginally culpable, perhaps it is not a constitutional violation in the first place.
We will inquire as we go along whether the Court has been sufficiently attentive to
this last point.
Here is how I plan to proceed. In Part II, I will review the foundational cases
to identify the kinds of clearly culpable officer conduct that generated the
recognition of Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment rights and the establishment of
federal exclusionary and damages remedies. Next, in Part III, I will examine the
pivotal case of Stone v. Powell.18 Here was a case where the officer conduct was
doubtfully culpable. Was this particular case an appropriate vehicle for limiting the
exclusionary rule? In what way? Was there a constitutional violation in the first
place? In Part IV, I next will examine the cases where Justice White’s approach in
Stone v. Powell was translated into governing law. Next, in Part V, I will discuss
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

428 U.S. 465 (1976).
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 490-91.
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 541-42 (White, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
468 U.S. 897.
475 U.S. 335.
129 S. Ct. at 701.
428 U.S. 465.
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Hudson v. Michigan,19 which signaled that a five-four majority had coalesced in the
Court to make a fundamental reexamination of the exclusionary rule. Next, in Part
VI, I will analyze the five-four majority’s struggle in Herring to define a standard
of culpability limiting the exclusionary rule. I will consider what the standard
means, its rationale, and whether the struggle has been necessary. Finally, I will
conclude by offering a suggestion as to how the Court might proceed as it struggles
onward.
So, let us begin by turning the clock back to 1914 and Weeks v. United
States.20
II. OFFICER CONDUCT THAT WAS CLEARLY CULPABLE AND VIOLATIVE OF
FOURTH/FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. Weeks v. United States Generates an Exclusionary Remedy for Officer Conduct
that Was Clearly Culpable and Violative of Fourth Amendment Rights
In Weeks v. United States, law enforcement officers conducted two searches of
the defendant’s house.21 In the first, local police officers entered the house without
a search or arrest warrant and seized some lottery tickets.22 They turned them over
to the United States Marshal, who conducted the second search of the house, again
without a warrant, and seized certain letters.23
In denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the letters, the federal trial court
ruled that it would not inquire into the manner in which they were obtained.24 The
Supreme Court disagreed, writing: “[i]f letters and private documents can thus be
seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such
searches and seizures, is of no value.”25 The marshal’s warrantless search was held
to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment; not only was the search without a
search warrant, but the marshal lacked grounds for getting one from the court.26
The first search, conducted by the local police officers, was a different story.
The Fourth Amendment did not apply to their conduct; it applied only to those who
acted under federal authority. The federal court could accept the evidence seized in
the first search under what came to be known as “the Silver Platter Doctrine,”
which survived until its demise in 1960 in Elkins v. United States.27
Thus, it would be up to states to decide whether to adopt an exclusionary rule
as a matter of state law to regulate the conduct of state officers. A dozen years
after Weeks, fourteen states had adopted an exclusionary rule, and thirty-one states
had rejected one. Among the latter, the most famous was a decision by New York
19. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
20. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
21. Id. at 386.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 388.
25. Id. at 393.
26. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393. The Fourth Amendment consists of two clauses: the Unreasonableness
Clause (no “unreasonable searches and seizures”) and the Warrant Clause (“No Warrant shall issue, but
upon probable cause.”). U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
27. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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Judge Benjamin Cardozo.
In People v. Defore, Judge Cardozo stated these facts:
A police officer arrested the defendant on a charge that he had stolen an overcoat.
The crime, if committed, was petit larceny, a misdemeanor. . . . The defendant
when taken into custody was in the hall of his boarding house. The officer after
making the arrest entered the defendant’s room and searched it. The search
28
produced a bag, and in the bag was a blackjack.

The search was held to be unlawful under state law. But what was the remedy?
“The officer might have been resisted, or sued for damages, or even prosecuted for
oppression.”29
But suppression of the evidence was not a proper remedy. In one of the law’s
more famous aphorisms, Judge Cardozo ruled that the criminal defendant should
not “go free because the constable has blundered.”30 Although famous, this
language harbored an ambiguity. What was meant by “blunder”? A mistake? If
so, how culpable a mistake? Did the officer mistakenly believe that the defendant’s
arrest took place close enough to his room that a warrant was unnecessary? The
question of how close is close enough has roiled the Supreme Court for forty years,
including last Term’s decision in Arizona v. Gant.31 Did the officer know that a
warrant was necessary but mistakenly believe that he could get away without
obtaining one? Or perhaps something in between?
Judge Cardozo did not attempt to resolve these questions, because he regarded
the establishment of an exclusionary rule as something for legislative judgment.
Why? Because the establishment of an exclusionary rule involved a balancing of
competing interests:
[W]e reflect how far-reaching in its effect upon society the new consequences
would be. The pettiest peace officer would have it in his power through overzeal
or indiscretion to confer immunity upon an offender for crimes the most flagitous .
...
The question is whether protection for the individual would not be gained at a
disproportionate loss of protection for society. On the one side is the social need
that crime shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that law shall not be
32
flouted by the insolence of office. There are dangers in any choice.

Judge Cardozo concluded: “We may not subject society to these dangers until
the Legislature has spoken with a clearer voice.”33
B. Wolf v. Colorado Incorporates Fourth Amendment Rights into the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Without Incorporating the Exclusionary Remedy
There matters rested until 1949. A state was free to reject an exclusionary

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

242 N.Y. 13, 17 (1926).
Id. at 19.
Id. at 21.
129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
Defore, 242 N.Y. at 23-25.
Id. at 24.
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rule, as thirty-one states continued to do. A state was free to adopt an exclusionary
rule, as now sixteen states did. Both the right and the remedy were completely
matters of state law.
Wolf v. Colorado presented two issues.34 First, should Fourth Amendment
rights be incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and thus made enforceable against state action? Second, if the right were to be
incorporated, should the exclusionary remedy be as well? The Court, per Justice
Frankfurter, answered the first question “yes” and the second question “no.” In
other words, the federal right would be incorporated, but the federal exclusionary
remedy would not be. The states were free to enforce Fourth/Fourteenth
Amendment rights by an exclusionary remedy or a damages remedy or both, as
they chose.35
In both holdings, Justice Frankfurter was influenced heavily by Justice
Cardozo. Justice Cardozo had laid out a theory of selective incorporation of federal
rights in Palko v. Connecticut, which incorporated only those rights contained in
the Bill of Rights that were “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”36 Justice
Frankfurter held: “The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society.
It is therefore implicit in ‘the concept of ordered liberty’ and as such enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause.”37
The second holding was influenced by Judge Cardozo’s reasoning in Defore.
Whether to establish an exclusionary remedy was a policy judgment for the states
based on a balancing of interests:
The jurisdictions which have rejected the Weeks doctrine have not left the right to
privacy without other means of protection. [Note 1: The common law provides
actions for damages against the searching officer.] Indeed, the exclusion of
evidence is a remedy which directly serves only to protect those upon whose
person or premises something incriminating has been found. We cannot,
therefore, regard it as a departure from basic standards to remand such persons,
together with those who emerge scatheless from a search, to the remedies of
private action. . . . Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an
effective way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to
condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process
Clause a State’s reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced,
would be equally effective. Weighty testimony against such an insistence on our
own view is furnished by the opinion of Mr. Justice (then Judge) Cardozo in
38
People v. Defore.

Justice Murphy, a former prosecutor, dissented, questioning whether a damages
remedy would be “equally effective”: “But what an illusory remedy this is, if by
‘remedy’ we mean a positive deterrent to police and prosecutors tempted to violate
the Fourth Amendment?”39
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

338 U.S. 25 (1949).
Id.
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28.
Id. at 30-32 & n.1.
Id. at 42-43 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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How culpable was the officers’ conduct in Wolf ? How deterrable? There is
not a word about the facts in Justice Frankfurter’s opinion; for him, this was an
abstract exercise in federalism balancing of interests.
Five years later in Irvine v. California, defense counsel argued that the
applicability of the federal exclusionary remedy to the states should vary with the
culpability of the officer.40 Justice Jackson’s opinion for the court flatly rejected
this:
It is suggested . . . that although we affirmed the conviction in Wolf, we should
reverse here because this invasion of privacy is more shocking, more offensive,
than the one involved there. The opinions in Wolf were written entirely in the
abstract and did not disclose the details of the constitutional violation. . . . [A]
distinction of the kind urged would leave the rule . . . indefinite. . . . That the rule
of exclusion and reversal results in the escape of guilty persons is more capable of
41
demonstration than that it deters invasions of right by the police.

But the trend in the states was beginning to shift. The year after Irvine v.
California, the California Supreme Court in 1955 adopted the exclusionary remedy,
after concluding that the damages remedy had “completely failed to secure
compliance with the constitutional provisions.”42
This is where matters stood when Dollree Mapp’s case arrived in the Supreme
Court in 1961.
C. Mapp v. Ohio Incorporates the Exclusionary Rule
To say that the police officers in Mapp v. Ohio had merely “blundered” would
fail to capture the culpability of their conduct.43 See how Justice Clark tells the
story:
On May 23, 1957, three Cleveland police officers arrived at [Miss Mapp’s]
residence in that city pursuant to information that “a person [was] hiding out in the
home, who was wanted for questioning in connection with a recent bombing, and
that there was a large amount of policy paraphernalia being hidden in the home.”
Miss Mapp and her daughter by a former marriage lived on the top floor of the
two-family dwelling. Upon their arrival at that house, the officers knocked on the
door and demanded entrance but appellant, after telephoning her attorney, refused
to admit them without a search warrant. They advised their headquarters of the
situation and undertook a surveillance of the house.
The officers again sought entrance some three hours later when four or more
additional officers arrived on the scene. When Miss Mapp did not come to the
door immediately, at least one of the several doors to the house was forcibly
opened and the policemen gained admittance. Meanwhile Miss Mapp’s attorney
arrived, but the officers, having secured their own entry, and continuing in their
defiance of the law, would permit him neither to see Miss Mapp nor to enter the
house. It appears that Miss Mapp was halfway down the stairs from the upper
floor to the front door when the officers, in this highhanded manner, broke into the
hall. She demanded to see the search warrant. A paper, claimed to be a warrant,
40.
41.
42.
43.

347 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1954).
Id. at 133-36.
People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (Cal. 1955).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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was held up by one of the officers. She grabbed the “warrant” and placed it in her
bosom. A struggle ensued in which the officers recovered the piece of paper and
as a result of which they handcuffed appellant because she had been “belligerent”
in resisting their official rescue of the “warrant” from her person. Running
roughshod over appellant, a policeman “grabbed” her, “twisted [her] hand,” and
she “yelled [and] pleaded with him” because “it was hurting.” Appellant, in
handcuffs, was then forcibly taken upstairs to her bedroom where the officers
searched a dresser, a chest of drawers, a closet and some suitcases. They also
looked into a photo album and through personal papers belonging to the appellant.
The search spread to the rest of the second floor including the child’s bedroom, the
living room, the kitchen and a dinette. . . .
At the trial no search warrant was produced by the prosecution, nor was the
44
failure to produce one explained or accounted for.

The officers’ conduct satisfied any reasonable definition of “culpable.” They knew
they needed a warrant, they did not get one, but instead pretended they had one.
They forcibly entered and searched the residence without a warrant and roughed up
Ms. Mapp.
In the intervening dozen years since Wolf v. Colorado, five of the Justices had
concluded that a damages remedy of the kind relied upon by Wolf was “worthless
and futile” and that an exclusionary remedy was necessary.45 Justice Clark’s
majority opinion read:
Today we once again examine Wolf’s constitutional documentation of the right to
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and, after its dozen years on our
books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence
secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right. . . . [W]ithout
[exclusion] the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral
and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court’s high regard as a freedom
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” . . .

Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against
rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we
can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.46
The need for an exclusionary remedy thus was framed in terms of “flagrant
abuse,” “brutish means,” and “rude invasions.”
Yet the exclusionary rule that Mapp established was framed in broader terms.
It required exclusion of “all evidence” unconstitutionally obtained: “We hold that
all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is,
by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”47 Ever since Mapp, the Court
has struggled in applying the exclusionary rule to cases presenting less culpable
conduct, as we shall see.
The disjunction between the kind of officer conduct that prompted the rule and
the terms of the rule itself did not go unnoticed. In a famous law review article
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 644-45 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 652.
Id. at 654, 656, 660.
Id. at 655 (emphasis added).
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published four years after Mapp, Judge Henry Friendly drew a distinction between
an officer’s “technical error” in an on-the-spot judgment and a “flagrant or
deliberate” violation of rights; only the latter, he argued, required suppression.48
Judge Friendly’s distinction left open a large middle ground. What should be
done about cases presenting more than “technical error” but less than “flagrant or
deliberate” conduct? These middle-ground cases, of course, would arise. 49
D. Monroe v. Pape Generates a Federal Damages Remedy for Officer Conduct
that Was Clearly Culpable and Violative of Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment Rights
Shortly before the Court declared in Mapp that state damages remedies were
“worthless and futile” to enforce Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Court
began the development of a federal action for damages to enforce those rights. In
Monroe v. Pape, 50 the conduct of the officers was even more culpable than that in
Mapp. The case came to the Court from a decision granting a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.51 The plaintiffs’ complaint had alleged that the officers,
acting without a search or arrest warrant, had done the following:
[O]n October 29, 1958, at 5:45 a.m., thirteen Chicago police officers, led by
Deputy Chief of Detectives Pape, broke through two doors of the Monroe
apartment, woke the Monroe couple with flashlights, and forced them at gunpoint
to leave their bed and stand naked in the center of the living room; that the officers
roused the six Monroe children and herded them into the living room; that
Detective Pape struck Mr. Monroe several times with his flashlight, calling him
“nigger” and “black boy”; that another officer pushed Mrs. Monroe; that other
officers hit and kicked several of the children and pushed them to the floor; that
the police ransacked every room, throwing clothing from closets to the floor,
dumping drawers, ripping mattress covers; that Mr. Monroe was then taken to the
police station and detained on “open” charges for ten hours, during which time he
was interrogated about a murder and exhibited in lineups; that he was not brought
before a magistrate, although numerous magistrate’s courts were accessible; that
he was not advised of his procedural rights; that he was not permitted to call his
family or an attorney; that he was subsequently released without criminal charges
52
having been filed against him.

48. Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929,
952-53 (1965).
49. Although the focus here is on the standard of culpability, other means of limiting the
exclusionary remedy should be noted. One prominent means is to limit exclusion to the prosecution’s
case-in-chief, permitting its use for impeachment purposes. Last Term, the Court explained the
impeachment exception as follows:
Our precedents make clear that the game of excluding tainted evidence for
impeachment purposes is not worth the candle. The interests safeguarded by such
exclusion are “outweighed by the need to prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of
the trial process.” . . . Once the defendant testifies in a way that contradicts prior
statements, denying the prosecution use of “the traditional truth-testing devices of the
adversary process” . . . is a high price to pay.
Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1846 (2009) (citations omitted).
50. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
51. Id. at 170.
52. Id. at 203 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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Obviously, no exclusionary remedy was available for the Monroe family, as no
criminal proceedings resulted from this flagrant police misconduct; for the
Monroes, it was damages or nothing.
The officers’ defense was not that they were justified in doing what they had
done, but that what they were alleged to have done was so flagrant that it violated
state law and should be heard in state rather than federal court.53
The Court interpreted the federal remedial statute to permit the action to
proceed.54 The Court did not address what, if any, culpability element a plaintiff
would need to satisfy, in addition to showing a constitutional violation, in order to
obtain damages under Section 1983.55 It merely noted that Section 1983 “should
be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the
natural consequences of his actions.”56
III. OFFICER CONDUCT DOUBTFULLY CULPABLE: STONE V. POWELL
A. Was There a Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment Violation in Stone v. Powell?
Stone v. Powell presented facts that, unlike those in Mapp and Monroe,
involved officer conduct that was doubtfully culpable or violative of
Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment rights.57
Defendant Lloyd Powell was arrested under a local vagrancy ordinance; the
search incident to the arrest produced a murder weapon.58 Powell argued that the
ordinance was unconstitutional and thus tainted the arrest and search.59 The state
courts upheld the ordinance and his murder conviction.60 The federal district court
on habeas held that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest under the
ordinance, whether or not it was constitutional; thus the arrest and search were
constitutional.61 After seven years of litigation, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held the ordinance unconstitutional and reversed the district court on the ground
that the ordinance’s unconstitutionality invalidated the arrest and search.62
Because the case came to the Supreme Court in a habeas posture, the Court
never addressed the constitutionality of Powell’s arrest. But three years later, when
a similar case came to the Court on direct review, the Court held that an arrest
could be constitutional even though the underlying ordinance was subsequently
invalidated.
In Michigan v. DeFillippo, the Court stated the question presented as follows:
“The question presented by this case is whether an arrest made in good-faith
reliance on an ordinance, which at the time had not been declared unconstitutional,
53. Id. at 172.
54. Id. at 183, 185 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil action for persons
deprived of constitutional rights).
55. Id. at 187.
56. 365 U.S. at 187.
57. 428 U.S. 465.
58. Id. at 469.
59. Id. at 470.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 471.
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is valid regardless of a subsequent judicial determination of its
unconstitutionality.”63 The Court upheld the arrest, ruling that probable cause
should not be negated “simply because [the officer] should have known the
ordinance was invalid and would be judicially declared unconstitutional.”64 The
Court reasoned:
A prudent officer, in the course of determining whether respondent had committed
an offense under all the circumstances shown by this record, should not have been
required to anticipate that a court would later hold the ordinance unconstitutional.
Police are charged to enforce laws until and unless they are declared
unconstitutional. The enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement
officers concerning its constitutionality—with the possible exception of a law so
grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence
would be bound to see its flaws. Society would be ill-served if its police officers
took it upon themselves to determine which laws are and which are not
65
constitutionally entitled to enforcement.

Thus, in hindsight, Lloyd Powell’s arrest was probably constitutional.
B. Justice Powell’s Cost-Benefit Balancing Approach
and Its Application to Federal Habeas
For Justice Powell, writing the majority (6-3) opinion, the issue was not
whether defendant Powell’s arrest was constitutional, but what level of deference
should be paid by a federal habeas court to the judgment of the state court. Justice
Powell’s answer was that the habeas court’s standard of review of
Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment claims should be highly deferential: As long as the
defendant received an opportunity for full and fair litigation in the state courts, the
judgment of constitutionality would stand.66
Put another way, the
Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment exclusionary rule would continue to apply with full
force in the state courts and in the Supreme Court on direct review, but it would
have sharply limited applicability on federal habeas.
Justice Powell reached that result by employing a cost-benefit balancing
approach: The costs of applying the Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment exclusionary
rule on habeas would be balanced against the benefits.67
Justice Powell identified the principal benefit of exclusion as “deterrence of
police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights.”68 The costs of exclusion
were canvassed in greater detail:
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule . . . are well known. . . . Application of
the rule . . . deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty. The
disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police officer and
the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule is contrary to the
idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice. Thus, although
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979).
Id. at 37.
Id. at 37-38.
Stone, 428 U.S. at 481-82.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 486.
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the rule is thought to deter unlawful police activity in part through the nurturing of
respect for Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately it may well have
the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of
69
justice.

Thus the goal of this approach was to prevent an imbalance between the magnitude
of the officer’s “error” and the perceived “windfall” afforded a criminal defendant.
C. Justice White’s Proposal to Apply the Balancing Approach
to the Exclusionary Rule Generally
Justice White dissented from Justice Powell’s decision largely to foreclose the
applicability of the exclusionary rule to federal habeas. But, more importantly, he
shared Justice Powell’s cost-benefit balancing approach; what he proposed was to
apply the approach to the exclusionary rule generally. Thus, he proposed that the
rule should be “substantially modified so as to prevent its application in those many
circumstances where the evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting in the
good-faith belief that his conduct comported with existing law and having
reasonable grounds for this belief.”70
Justice White’s reference to the officer’s reasonable good faith belief
suggested an alignment between the standard of culpability for the exclusionary
remedy and the standard of culpability for the damages remedy. If the officer’s
conduct was insufficiently culpable to justify damages, it should be insufficiently
culpable to justify exclusion: “If the defendant in criminal cases may not recover
[damages] for a mistaken but good-faith invasion of his privacy, it makes even less
sense to exclude the evidence solely on his behalf.”71
This requires a brief look at how the standard of culpability had developed in
federal damages cases.
In Pierson v. Ray, the Court held that officers sued for damages under Section
1983 for Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment violations had at their disposal a “defense”
of “good faith and probable cause.”72 The Court wrote, “We hold that the defense
of good faith and probable cause, which the Court of Appeals found available to
the officers in the common-law action for false arrest and imprisonment, is also
available to them in the action under Section 1983.”73
Although this was in form a “defense,” in function a plaintiff had an informal
burden to negate “good faith” by showing some sort of culpability of the officer.
By 1976 the Court had refined what a plaintiff “characteristically” had to show:
Characteristically the Court has . . . identif[ied] the circumstances in which
qualified immunity would not be available. Referring both to the objective and
subjective elements, we have held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an
official “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his
sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the
[plaintiff], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 489-91 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 541-42.
386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
Id.
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74

deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.”

Thus, functionally, a plaintiff had to meet an objective or subjective test of officer
culpability in order to obtain damages.
Subsequent to 1976, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court eliminated the
subjective test and framed the objective test in terms such that a plaintiff would
have the functional, informal burden to show that the officer had violated “clearly
established” constitutional rights “of which a reasonable person would have
known.”75
In United States v. Leon,76 as we will see next, Justice White was able to
muster a majority to adopt his proposal to modify the exclusionary rule by applying
Stone’s cost-benefit balancing approach to the rule generally.
IV. OFFICER CONDUCT DOUBTFULLY CULPABLE: UNITED STATES V. LEON
A. Was There a Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment Violation in Leon?
In United States v. Leon, the lower federal courts had invalidated a search
warrant on the ground that it was unsupported by probable cause and thus violated
the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, which declares that “no Warrant
shall issue, but upon probable cause.”77 The resultant search was therefore
invalidated under the Unreasonableness Clause.78
In seeking Supreme Court review, the prosecution in Leon did not urge the
warrant’s validity, but instead argued that the exclusionary rule should be modified
along the lines suggested by Justice White eight years earlier:
The Government’s petition for certiorari expressly declined to seek review of the
lower courts’ determinations that the search warrant was unsupported by probable
cause and presented only the question “[w]hether the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence
seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently
79
held to be defective.”

In writing the majority (6-3) opinion, Justice White recognized the Court’s power
to address the issue of constitutional violation: “[I]t undoubtedly is within our
power to consider the question whether probable cause existed under the ‘totality of
the circumstances’ test announced last Term in Illinois v. Gates.”80
Unsurprisingly, Justice White “[chose] to exercise”81 the power to address the
modification of the exclusionary rule. He stated the question presented:
This case presents the question whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution’s case in chief
of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Harlow v. Fitgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
Id. at 818.
468 U.S. 897.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
468 U.S. 897. See also supra note 26.
Id. at 905.
Id.
Id.
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issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported
82
by probable cause.

This skipping over the issue of constitutional violation to get to the issue of remedy
drew a charge of judicial activism from Justice Stevens in dissent:
[T]here is . . . a substantial question whether the warrant complied with the
Fourth Amendment. There was a strong dissent on the probable-cause issue when
Leon was before the Court of Appeals, and that dissent has been given added force
by this Court’s intervening decision in Illinois v. Gates . . . , which constituted a
significant development in the law. It is probable, though admittedly not certain,
that the Court of Appeals would now conclude that the warrant in Leon satisfied
the Fourth Amendment if it were given the opportunity to reconsider the issue in
the light of Gates. . . .
The Court seems determined to decide [this case] on the broadest possible
grounds; such determination is utterly at odds with the Court’s traditional practice
83
as well as any principled notion of judicial restraint.

Justice Stevens also chastised the majority for its illogic as well as its activism:
“We cannot intelligibly assume, arguendo, that a search was constitutionally
unreasonable but that the seized evidence is admissible because the same search
was reasonable.”84
Could there have been an argument, based on the reasoning of Michigan v.
DeFillippo, that “officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant” could
sometimes conduct a search that was constitutionally reasonable?85 Justice White
noted DeFillippo but referred to it as a decision “not involving the scope of the
rule.”86
Justice White did address the possibility that, if this kind of skipping became
commonplace in the lower courts, the development of constitutional rights might
become frozen and never become clearly established enough to justify either
exclusionary or damages relief.87 Justice White was satisfied that the lower court
would “exercise an informed discretion in making this choice”:
Nor are we persuaded that application of a good-faith exception to searches
conducted pursuant to warrants will preclude review of the constitutionality of the
search or seizure, deny needed guidance from the courts, or freeze Fourth
Amendment law in its present state. There is no need for courts to adopt the
inflexible practice of always deciding whether the officers’ conduct manifested
objective good faith before turning to the question whether the Fourth Amendment
has been violated. . . . As cases addressing questions of good-faith immunity
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . make clear, courts have considerable discretion in
conforming their decisionmaking processes to the exigencies of particular cases. . .
.
We have no reason to believe that our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
would suffer by allowing . . . courts to exercise an informed discretion in making
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 900.
Id. at 960, 961-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
468 U.S. at 961.
Id. at 900 (majority opinion).
Id. at 911.
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Had Justice White himself exercised “an informed discretion” in making his
choice? In possible defense of his choice, Justice White dropped a footnote to the
above-quoted text to suggest that skipping had the virtue of easing pressure on
judges to “bend” constitutional standards. 89 Quoting a commentator, the footnote
read:
It has been suggested, in fact, that “the recognition of a ‘penumbral zone,’ within
which an inadvertent mistake would not call for exclusion . . . will make it less
tempting for judges to bend [F]ourth [A]mendment standards to avoid releasing a
possibly dangerous criminal because of a minor and unintentional miscalculation
90
by the police.”

The price of avoiding this bending of constitutional standards was to make possibly
unnecessary remedial law.
B. Justice White Converts His Stone v. Powell Proposal into Law
Justice White “modified” the exclusionary rule along the lines he had proposed
in Stone v. Powell by employing the cost-benefit balancing approach of that case:
Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular
case . . . must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use
91
in the prosecution’s case in chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence.
. . . . [T]he balancing approach that has evolved during the years of
experience with the rule provides strong support for the modification currently
92
urged upon us.

Here, as in Stone v. Powell, 93 the goal was to prevent an imbalance between the
magnitude of the police misconduct and the “windfall” afforded a criminal
defendant:
The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the
vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source of concern. . . .
Particularly when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or
their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred on
94
such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.

In order to prevent this imbalance, the “flagrancy of the police misconduct” had to
be carefully weighed: “[An] assessment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct
constitutes an important step in the calculus.”95
The greater the flagrancy or culpability of the misconduct, the more the
balance tipped toward exclusion; the less the flagrancy or culpability, the less the
balance tipped toward exclusion. Leon, Justice White held, was an example of the
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 924-25 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 925, n.26.
426 U.S. at 925, n.26.
Id. at 906-07.
Id. at 913.
428 U.S. at 490.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08.
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latter: “We conclude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently
invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.”96
As to the standard of culpability, it was variously phrased as “objective
reasonableness,”97 “objective good faith,”98 or “objectively reasonable reliance.”99
Whatever the precise definition, it was obviously close to the standard for damages
established two years earlier in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.100 Two years after Leon,
Justice White made the alignment of the standards explicit when he wrote for the
Court in Malley v. Briggs: “[W]e hold that the same standard of objective
reasonableness that we applied in the context of a suppression hearing in Leon . . .
defines the qualified immunity accorded an officer [in an action for damages].”101
Justice White described the standard as providing “ample protection to all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”102 What Justice
White seemed to be suggesting was that officers “who knowingly violate the law,”
such as the officers in Weeks, Mapp, and Monroe, would be subject to an
“objective reasonableness” standard. Whether this standard was a good fit with
those facts was left unaddressed, as was whether a “knowing” standard was really
“objective”—puzzling questions that would recur in Herring.
What this alignment of the standards meant was that for some low-culpability
federal constitutional violations, there would be a federal right without a federal
remedy. Functionally, this represented a partial return to the regime of Wolf v.
Colorado, where it would fall to the states to decide what remedy should attend a
Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment violation. But nowhere in Justice White’s opinions
does he indicate any recognition of this functional partial resurrection of Wolf.
C. What Is the Rationale of Exclusion?
The stated rationale of exclusion is labeled “deterrence.” In Leon, Justice
White declared that the exclusionary rule “is designed to deter police
misconduct.”103 But how do the Justices know what standard of culpability will
yield optimal deterrence? Is this an empirical judgment? If so, what is the
evidence for it? If not, is “deterrence” the best label to explain what is sought to be
achieved by exclusion?
Justice Blackmun’s concurrence pointed out that Justice White’s opinion
lacked empirical support; instead, it rested on “untested predictions about police
conduct”:
By their very nature, the assumptions on which we proceed today cannot be
cast in stone. To the contrary, they now will be tested in the real world of state
and federal law enforcement, and this Court will attend to the results. If it should

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 922.
Id. at 923, n.24.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 922.
457 U.S. at 807-08.
475 U.S. at 344.
Id. at 341.
468 U.S. at 916.
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emerge from experience that, contrary to our expectations, the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule results in a material change in police
compliance with the Fourth Amendment, we shall have to reconsider what we
have undertaken here. The logic of a decision that rests on untested predictions
104
about police conduct demands no less.

It is hard to shake the suspicion that what is going on here might be better
captured by the label “sanction.” And there are clues in Justice White’s opinion
that point in that direction. He described exclusion as an “extreme sanction”105 and
as “[p]enalizing the officer.”106 We will have occasion to ponder this further when
we come to Herring.
D. Two Post-Leon Cases Where the Prosecution Conceded a
Constitutional Violation
In Illinois v. Krull, an officer relied upon a state statute authorizing warrantless
administrative inspections of automobile dealers’ records and vehicles.107
Subsequently, the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated the statute on
Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment grounds and upheld suppression of the evidence
seized by the officer. In seeking review by the United States Supreme Court, the
prosecution did not challenge the invalidation of the statute, nor did the prosecution
argue that since the officer acted in reasonable reliance on the statute the inspection
was constitutionally permissible.108 Rather, the prosecution sought a good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule along the lines of Leon.109
The Court granted review on the terms sought by the prosecution, writing:
“We granted certiorari . . . to consider whether a good-faith exception to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule applies when an officer’s reliance on the
constitutionality of a statute is objectively reasonable, but the statute is
subsequently declared unconstitutional.”110
The Court saw the case as a logical successor to Leon, stating:
In United States v. Leon . . . this Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained by police officers who acted
in objectively reasonable reliance upon a search warrant issued by a neutral
magistrate, but where the warrant was ultimately found to be unsupported by
probable cause. . . . The present case presents the question whether a similar
exception to the exclusionary rule should be recognized when officers act in
objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute authorizing warrantless
administrative searches, but where the statute is ultimately found to violate the
111
Fourth Amendment.

The Court applied the same kind of cost-benefit balancing analysis as in Leon:
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 927-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. at 916 (majority opinion).
Id. at 921.
480 U.S. 340 (1987).
Id. at 345-46.
Id. at 346.
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As with any remedial device, application of the exclusionary rule properly
has been restricted to those situations in which its remedial purpose is effectively
advanced. Thus in various circumstances, the Court has examined whether the
rule’s deterrent effect will be achieved, and has weighed the likelihood of such
deterrence against the costs of withholding reliable information from the truthseeking process.
. . . The approach used in Leon is equally applicable to the present case. . . .
To paraphrase the Court’s comment in Leon: “Penalizing the officer for the
[Legislature’s] error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the
112
deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.”

And the Court held that the officer’s reliance on the statute was objectively
reasonable: “Assuming, as we do for purposes of this case, that the Illinois
Supreme Court was correct in its constitutional analysis, th[e] defect in the statute
was not sufficiently obvious so as to render a police officer’s reliance upon the
statute objectively unreasonable.”113
In Arizona v. Evans, an officer relied upon a computer record indicating that
there was an outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant.114 The computer record
turned out to be inaccurate, and the defendant moved to suppress the evidence
seized as a result of the arrest. In the Supreme Court, the prosecution made no
argument that the officer’s reasonable reliance on the record made the arrest
constitutionally reasonable: “Petitioner has conceded that respondent’s arrest
violated the Fourth Amendment. . . . We decline to review that determination.”115
Again, the Court followed the reasoning of Leon: Applying the reasoning of Leon
to the facts of this case, we conclude that the decision of the Arizona Supreme
Court must be reversed. . . . If court employees were responsible for the erroneous
computer record, the exclusion of evidence at trial would not sufficiently deter
116
future errors so as to warrant such a severe sanction.

The Court did not address the question whether a different result would obtain
if the error had been committed by police personnel.117 That question, however,
would appear in Herring.
V. HUDSON V. MICHIGAN TRANSFORMS THE MAPP RULE INTO THE MAPP “DICTA”
Hudson v. Michigan presented the question whether a categorical exception
should be made to the exclusionary rule for a category of Fourth Amendment law
called “knock-and-announce.”118 In Hudson, the prosecution conceded on appeal
that officers executing a search warrant had not waited long enough between
knocking and entering, and thus had failed to comply with the “knock-andannounce” requirement.119 Justice Scalia, for a five-Justice majority, was happy to

112.
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480 U.S. at 359.
514 U.S. 1 (1995).
Id. at 6, n.1 (citations omitted).
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
547 U.S. 586, 588 (2006).
Id. at 590.

2010]

EXCLUSIONARY RULE

283

accept this concession: “Happily . . . issues [of compliance] do not confront us
here. From the trial level onward, Michigan has conceded that the entry was a
knock-and-announce violation. The issue here is remedy . . . [and] whether the
exclusionary rule is appropriate for violation of the knock-and-announce
requirement.”120
In deciding whether there should be a categorical exception to the exclusionary
rule for knock-and-announce violations, Justice Scalia followed Leon’s cost-benefit
balancing approach. He wrote:
The costs here are considerable. In addition to the grave adverse
consequence that exclusion of relevant incriminating evidence always entails (viz.,
the risk of releasing dangerous criminals into society), imposing that massive
remedy for a knock-and-announce violation would generate a constant flood of
alleged failures to observe the rule. . . .
The cost of entering this lottery would be small, but the jackpot enormous:
suppression of all evidence, amounting in many cases to a get-out-of-jail-free card.
...
If the consequences of running afoul of the rule were so massive, officers
would be inclined to wait longer than the law requires—producing preventable
violence against officers in some cases and the destruction of evidence in many
121
others.

The benefits, on the other hand, were “not worth a lot”:
Next to these “substantial social costs” we must consider the deterrence
benefits. . . .
To begin with, the value of deterrence depends upon the strength of the
incentive to commit the forbidden act. Viewed from this perspective, deterrence
of knock-and-announce violations is not worth a lot. . . . [I]gnoring knock-andannounce can realistically be expected to achieve absolutely nothing except the
prevention of destruction of evidence and the avoidance of life-threatening
resistance by occupants of the premises—dangers which if there is even
“reasonable suspicion” of their existence, suspend the knock-and-announce
122
requirement anyway. Massive deterrence is hardly required.

Hudson is less important for this holding than for the words that Justice Scalia
had for Mapp v. Ohio on its forty-fifth anniversary (four days later). Mapp was
told that a lot had happened since its “heyday.”123 Leon had made it clear that
something more than a constitutional violation was required for an exclusionary
remedy: “Suppression of evidence . . . has always been our last resort, not our first
impulse. The exclusionary rule generates ‘substantial social costs’ . . . which
sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large. . . . We have
rejected ‘[i]ndiscriminate application’ of the rule.”124
The Mapp rule that “all” evidence unconstitutionally seized had to be
suppressed should now be viewed, according to Justice Scalia, as “[e]xpansive

120.
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dicta”: “Expansive dicta in Mapp . . . suggested wide scope for the exclusionary
rule. . . . (‘[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court’).”125 The
“new” rule was now the Leon rule.
How did Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia’s crucial fifth vote, regard Justice
Scalia’s treatment of Mapp? In an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, Justice Kennedy delphically assured the reader that “the continued
operation of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is not
in doubt.”126 But which of “our precedents” did Justice Kennedy have in mind?
More would be revealed in Herring.
VI. HERRING V. UNITED STATES
A. Was There a Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment Violation in Herring?
In Herring v. United States, the defendant claimed that his arrest by local law
enforcement officers in Coffee County, Alabama, had violated his
Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment rights.127 Here are the facts of the arrest as set forth
in the majority opinion by Chief Justice Roberts:
On July 7, 2004, Investigator Mark Anderson learned that Bennie Dean
Herring had driven to the Coffee County Sheriff’s Department to retrieve
something from his impounded truck. Herring was no stranger to law
enforcement, and Anderson asked the county’s warrant clerk, Sandy Pope, to
check for any outstanding warrants for Herring’s arrest. When she found none,
Anderson asked Pope to check with Sharon Morgan, her counterpart in
neighboring Dale County. After checking Dale County’s computer database,
Morgan replied that there was an active arrest warrant for Herring’s failure to
appear on a felony charge. Pope relayed the information to Anderson and asked
Morgan to fax over a copy of the warrant as confirmation. Anderson and a deputy
128
followed Herring as he left the impound lot, pulled him over, and arrested him.

There had, however, been a “mix-up” by personnel in the sheriff’s office in the
neighboring county (Dale County); their computer records failed to show that the
warrant had been “recalled”:
There had, however been a mistake about the warrant. The Dale [C]ounty
[S]heriff’s computer records are supposed to correspond to actual arrest warrants,
which the office also maintains. But when Morgan went to the files to retrieve the
actual warrant to fax to Pope, Morgan was unable to find it. She called a court
clerk and learned that the warrant had been recalled five months earlier. Normally
when a warrant is recalled the court clerk’s office or a judge’s chambers calls
Morgan, who enters the information in the sheriff’s computer database and
disposes of the physical copy. For whatever reason, the information about the
recall of the warrant for Herring did not appear in the database. Morgan
immediately called Pope to alert her to the mix[-]up, and Pope contacted Anderson
over a secure radio. This all unfolded in 10 to 15 minutes, but Herring had already
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. (citations omitted).
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been arrested and found with [a] gun and drugs, just a few hundred yards from the
129
sheriff’s office.

The defendant moved to suppress the gun and drugs seized incident to his arrest;
the prosecution argued that, notwithstanding the “mix-up," the arresting officers
had probable cause to believe that there was an active felony warrant for his
arrest.130
The federal district court, in the exercise of its “informed discretion,”131
skipped over the issue of whether there had been an unconstitutional arrest and
denied suppression on the ground that “the arresting officers had acted in a goodfaith belief that the warrant was still outstanding.”132 The Court of Appeals applied
Leon’s cost-benefit balancing approach and affirmed.133 It reasoned that, because
the database error “was merely negligent and attenuated from the arrest,” the
benefit of suppressing the evidence “would be marginal or nonexistent.”134
Chief Justice Roberts’ majority (5-4) opinion stated that the arresting officers
“did nothing improper.”135 But he noted that the Court of Appeals had concluded
that “somebody in Dale County should have updated the computer database. . . . ”136
Did this failure to update a database constitute a Fourth/Fourteenth
Amendment violation? The parties assumed that this was so, and Chief Justice
Roberts accepted their assumption:
When a probable-cause determination was based on reasonable but mistaken
assumptions, the person subjected to a search or seizure has not necessarily been
the victim of a constitutional violation. . . . For purposes of deciding this case,
however, we accept the parties’ assumption that there was a Fourth Amendment
137
violation. The issue is whether the exclusionary rule should be applied.

Was this a sound assumption? Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the error
“was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest.”138 But he did not
pause to question the assumption of unconstitutionality. Instead, he put the question
presented as whether the exclusionary rule should be applied when “an officer
reasonably believes there is an outstanding arrest warrant, but that belief turns out
to be wrong because of a negligent bookkeeping error by another police
employee[.]”139
B. What Was the Majority’s Standard of Culpability?
In conducting the Leon cost-benefit balancing analysis, Chief Justice Roberts
succinctly stated that the extent to which suppression is justified by deterrence
129.
130.
131.
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133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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principles “varies with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct.”140 This
required a definition of “culpability,” which he then supplied:
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that
such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our
cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly
141
negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.

Chief Justice Roberts grounded this definition in the history of the
exclusionary rule, which arose from police conduct that was “intentional” or
“flagrant”:
[T]he abuses that gave rise to the exclusionary rule featured intentional
conduct that was patently unconstitutional. In Weeks . . . a foundational
exclusionary rule case, the officers had broken into the defendant’s home. . . .
Equally flagrant conduct was at issue in Mapp v. Ohio. . . . An error that
arises from nonrecurring and attenuated negligence is thus far removed from the
core concerns that led us to adopt the rule in the first place. And in fact since
Leon, we have never applied the rule to exclude evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, where the police conduct was no more intentional or
142
culpable than this.

Notwithstanding his inclusion of “deliberate conduct” in his definition, Chief
Justice Roberts characterized the standard of culpability as “objective.”143 Perhaps
he did this to keep faith with Leon. But he cited as support a footnote in Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent. If one looks at the footnote, it is obvious that Justice Ginsburg
was needling the Chief Justice, not supporting him. She writes: “It is not clear how
the Court squares its focus on deliberate conduct with its recognition that
application of the exclusionary rule does not require inquiry into the mental state of
the police.”144
Harlow v. Fitzgerald had adopted an “objective” standard of culpability in
actions for damages because of the burdens and realities of this kind of civil
litigation. But why restrict the standard of culpability for exclusion to an
“objective” standard in cases of “intentional” or “flagrant” conduct like Weeks or
Mapp?
Applying the standard of culpability to the arresting officers, Chief Justice
Roberts held that they were insufficiently culpable to support an exclusionary
remedy: “In Leon we held that ‘the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently
invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.’ . . .
The same is true when evidence is obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a
subsequently recalled warrant.”145
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Applying the standard of culpability to the “somebody in Dale County,”146
Chief Justice Roberts adopted the court of Appeals’ finding of “fact” that the error
was “negligent” but not “reckless” as “crucial to our holding.” He reasoned, “The
Eleventh Circuit . . . concluded that this error was negligent, but did not find it to
be reckless or deliberate. . . . That fact is crucial to our holding.”147
This is puzzling. Negligence is not a “fact,” but a mixed question of law and
fact. Chief Justice Roberts is himself functionally defining the error here as
“isolated negligence”148 or “nonrecurring and attenuated negligence”149 and not
“reckless.” “[N]o such showings were made here,” he wrote.150
Thus, Chief Justice Roberts’s standard of culpability is not only uncertain in its
definition, but puzzling in its application. All that remains to hit the trifecta is an
uncertain rationale.
C. What Is the Rationale of Exclusion?
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg wondered why the majority considered
negligent conduct insufficiently deterrable:
The exclusionary rule, the Court suggests, is capable of only marginal
deterrence when the misconduct at issue is merely careless, not intentional or
reckless. . . . The suggestion runs counter to a foundational premise of tort law—
that liability for negligence, i.e., lack of due care, creates an incentive to act with
greater care.
That the mistake here involved the failure to make a computer entry hardly
means that application of the exclusionary rule would have minimal value. . . .
Is it not altogether obvious that the Department could take further precautions
151
to ensure the integrity of its database?

Chief Justice Roberts replied that deterrence of negligent conduct did not “pay
its way” and was “not worth the cost”:
In light of our repeated holdings that the deterrent effect of suppression must
be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice system . . . we conclude that
when police mistakes are the result of negligence such as that described here,
rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any
152
marginal deterrence does not “pay its way.”
We do not quarrel with Justice Ginsburg’s claim that “liability for negligence
. . . creates an incentive to act with greater care,” and we do not suggest that the
exclusion of this evidence could have no deterrent effect. But our cases require
any deterrence to “be weighed against the ‘substantial social costs exacted by the
153
exclusionary rule,’” and here exclusion is not worth the cost.

When the majority holds that deterrence of negligent conduct does not “pay its
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way” or is not “worth the cost,” how do these Justices know that? Is this a matter
of empirical fact? If so, where is the evidence for it? If not, is “deterrence” the
best explanation?
A simpler explanation would be that some negligent conduct is not
constitutionally unreasonable. And where conduct is judged constitutionally
unreasonable, then the more supportable inquiry would be whether the conduct is
judged sufficiently culpable to deserve the sanction of suppression.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Herring, the Court skipped over the issue of constitutional violation by
“somebody” in order to produce an uncertain definition, application, and rationale
of the standard of culpability for the exclusionary remedy. In doing so, did the
Court exercise “an informed discretion”?154 I doubt it. I recognize the generally
understood proposition that decision of a constitutional question should be avoided
if possible. But this avoidance strategy typically arises when a law of a lesser
order—statute, regulation, or rule—can be interpreted to avoid the constitutional
question. In those cases, avoidance of decision of a constitutional question is a
prudential course to steer the Court in a more prudent direction. But avoidance
here works in the opposite direction. It steers the Court into making a judgment
about whether an officer's conduct was sufficiently culpable to produce
“deterrence” that is “worth the cost,” instead of making a judgment about whether
the conduct was culpable enough to be constitutionally unreasonable. The latter
judgment rests on a firmer judicial foundation. This is particularly true in the case
of the Court’s suggested inquiry into “systemic negligence.” A judgment about
what it takes to achieve worthwhile “deterrence” of the system as a whole is surely
more speculative than a judgment about whether the system has functioned in a
constitutionally reasonable manner.
If the Court would attend with greater care to the issue of constitutional
violation, that might either obviate decision of the remedial issue or cast light on
how it should be decided. If the Court decided that there was sufficient culpability
to make out a constitutional violation, it could then use that decision to inform its
judgment of what additional culpability was required for the exclusionary remedy
and why that was so.
Later this past Term, the Court supplied an illustration of how the
constitutional analysis could inform the remedial analysis. In Safford United School
District v. Redding, the Court first satisfied itself that school officials had
committed a Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment violation by strip-searching a student,
before holding that this violation was not culpable enough to justify a damages
remedy.155 This could be a useful lesson for the Herring majority as it struggles
onward.

154. Leon, 468 U.S. at 925.
155. 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).

